Anatomy of a Rootkit Hack

 
 
By Cameron Sturdevant  |  Posted 2005-03-21 Email Print this article Print
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Reader's experience serves as a note of caution as rootkits spread to Windows.

Last November, an eWEEK reader who is an IT executive at a large organization was notified by his companys help desk that the companys Microsoft Corp. Exchange e-mail servers had gone offline.

Further investigation revealed that the Temp directory of the Exchange servers—along with other crucial directories and files—was suddenly missing. The result was 500GB of unavailable e-mail data.

The problem affected dozens of users and took nearly four days to solve. The entire help desk team was pulled from daily support tasks and pressed into a server-by-server, desktop-by-desktop recovery effort. By the end of the ordeal, it was determined that nearly 40 data center servers had been affected, many of which had to be rebuilt from scratch.

The problem? The machines had been infected by a user-level rootkit.

Click here to read about the tools and tricks of the hacking trade. During an exclusive interview with eWEEK Labs last month, the IT executive described the attack and the step-by-step recovery efforts his company undertook. eWEEK Labs agreed not to name the IT executive or his organization.

Rootkits are widely known in the Unix and Linux community, but they are a fairly new problem in the Windows operating system world.

Indeed, at last months RSA Conference in San Francisco, a workshop focused on the emerging threat rootkits are posing to Windows. User-level rootkit hacks like the one described here are bad enough, but when it comes to a server infected with a kernel-level hack, "Nuke it from space" was the advice provided by the Microsoft employees leading the session. For more on the differences between user-level and kernel-level rootkits, click here. The user-level rootkit that felled the IT executives servers was tailored for French language use, and thats how it evaded detection by a widely deployed anti-virus tool used at the execs company . The executive suspects that an administrative assistant given to wide-ranging Internet use was the weak link that enabled the rootkit infection once the rootkit was inside the network.

A forensic examination of Machine Zero revealed a keystroke logger with extensive records dating back several months.

Before this was discovered, however, a PC support technician responding to the administrative assistants report of a desktop slowdown committed a grave error—one that allowed the rootkit to spread from the users desktop to the servers. Unable to gain access to the system using the regular administrator account, the technician decided to use the domain administrator account to gain access to the PC. At this point, the rootkit was off to the races.

Almost instantaneously, the password grabber that was part of the rootkit used the domain administrator account to infect servers on the local network. The effect was devastating to the IT executives organization in more ways than one: E-mail was knocked offline in order for the hijacked servers to act as illicit distribution points for the "Bennifer" bomb "Gigli"—dubbed into French.

To recover from the infection, the IT executive first had the central network staff poison the DNS (Domain Name System) tables, cutting off the rootkits default connections to the outside world—in this case, several sites in France and two major American universities that, unbeknown to network managers, housed infected systems that were acting as robot controllers.

The wily rootkit didnt make recovery easy, though.

"We tried booting from ERD Commander [a utility from Winternals Software LP] to change the local password, but the root kit [later known as SpartaDoor and by Symantec Corp. as trojan.backdoor] checked the box preventing the user from changing the password," the IT executive said. "We missed that trick, costing us a lot of time."

Next page: Rootkit fundamentals.



 
 
 
 
Cameron Sturdevant Cameron Sturdevant is the executive editor of Enterprise Networking Planet. Prior to ENP, Cameron was technical analyst at PCWeek Labs, starting in 1997. Cameron finished up as the eWEEK Labs Technical Director in 2012. Before his extensive labs tenure Cameron paid his IT dues working in technical support and sales engineering at a software publishing firm . Cameron also spent two years with a database development firm, integrating applications with mainframe legacy programs. Cameron's areas of expertise include virtual and physical IT infrastructure, cloud computing, enterprise networking and mobility. In addition to reviews, Cameron has covered monolithic enterprise management systems throughout their lifecycles, providing the eWEEK reader with all-important history and context. Cameron takes special care in cultivating his IT manager contacts, to ensure that his analysis is grounded in real-world concern. Follow Cameron on Twitter at csturdevant, or reach him by email at cameron.sturdevant@quinstreet.com.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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