Software developers and enterprise IT departments are making computer security blunders every day because of myths, misconceptions and just plain "dumb ideas."
Despite a growing awareness
of security threats and basic security measures necessary to secure networks
and data, many misconceptions and myths keep computer users and enterprises at
risk, a security consultant said at a Kaspersky Lab event in New York City.
While organizations are
deploying firewalls, public key cryptography and complying with various
security and privacy regulations, many of them are still hanging on to certain
misperceptions, "falsehoods" and approaches that don't work, Charles
Pfleeger, a security constant and principal of the Pfleeger Consulting Group,
said in a keynote speech on Nov. 10 at American Cup 2012. Kaspersky Lab's educational event was jointly held with NYU-Polytechnic University in New York City. Some
of the "dumb ideas" were myths held by nonsecurity professionals, and
others were attitudes still circulating within the security community, Pfleeger
said.
In 2005, Marcus Ranum, a
chief of security for Tenable Security, published six "dumbest ideas in
computer security," including the idea that hacking is cool and just
patching flaws found in software products will make it more secure. While many
of Ranum's points were valid, Pfleeger developed his own list of security
mistakes that are made every day in organizations around the world. The
security mistakes are generally the result of ignorance and limited time
available to address issues, he said.
"There are a lot of
dumb ideas," Pfleeger said.
The first one was the idea
that organizations can retrofit security, Pfleeger said. Often, when an
organization is acquiring another company, or designing and developing a product,
if the security question comes up, the most common attitude is, "We will
do security later," Pfleeger said.
As systems grow increasingly
complex, it becomes harder to retrofit software with effective security
features, and even if it is possible, it's never as effective as if it had been
part of the product from the beginning, according to Pfleeger. He also said
"penetrate and patch" doesn't work, echoing Ranum's previous list,
because it just means organizations are just plugging existing holes and not
addressing the overall security issues.
He used a construction
analogy, noting that if a contractor is asked to build a house, but directed to
make sure the house has electricity only after the walls and roof were
complete, it would still be possible, but it wouldn't be as effective and would
require finished walls and ceilings to be to be broken open and refinished.
Microsoft had to do just
that a few years ago. Bill Gates was able to say, "Stop everything. We are
going to go back and put security in," Pfleeger said. Since then,
Microsoft has implemented a methodology that integrates security into every step
of development and builds security in by design. Bill Gates was able to do go
back and start afresh, but not everyone can do so, said Pfleeger.