The Long Road for NAC

The honeymoon's over, and Network Access Control has a long, tough road ahead of it.

Like eWEEK Channel Insider Technology Editor Frank Ohlhorst, I'm basically enthusiastic for and optimistic about NAC. NAC is a generic use of the name for Cisco's Network Access Control. It has come to be used for the entire approach to qualifying endpoints before they gain access to a network.

As Ohlhorst says, the two big players in this market are Cisco and Microsoft with its NAP (Network Access Protection). There are a number of smaller vendors in the market too, but it's not all good times for them. Lockdown Networks, Vernier, and Caymas Systems have all gone out of business, or at least out of the NAC business, in the last few months. But there are larger, deeper companies also in the business, like Juniper and Symantec. It's not going away.

There's no shortage of new and useful technologies that enterprises should be adopting, and I'm not surprised that they're not climbing all over each other to adopt NAC. First, once they come to realize what NAC actually does, some buyers must be disappointed. It doesn't keep compromised or malicious systems off of your network-at least not directly. What it does is to set certain configuration qualifications for access to your network and to enforce them.

That means you can make sure that a system has a personal firewall, anti-virus updated no more than n days ago, all the latest patches, and so on. You can define your own requirements, too. Those with problems are put into a sandboxed subnet from which they can remediate their problems and seek help but not access sensitive network resources.

But nothing specifically stops the "good" clients from being compromised through vulnerabilities undetected by their software. And NAC systems are not invulnerable themselves. Every now and then they get their own vulnerability disclosures, and you can rest assured that this is an area that has not yet been rigorously tested. The more popular NAC becomes, the more attacks on it will be unearthed.

Perhaps the biggest problem with NAC is political. NAC is surely seen by end users as one more pain they must endure just to get their work done. Think of the trouble IT departments have just keeping iPhones off of the network. The only way some departments will begin NAC deployments is with the understanding that they will be compromised from the beginning.

For all these reasons, NAC as a product set isn't going to make it. In the longer term, NAC will become part of the landscape of services offered by networking systems. Better support for devices will help a lot, and for that the only real hope is a standard for them to follow.

The standards action in this space is at the Trusted Computing Group and the IETF's NEA (Network Endpoint Assessment) Working Group. At the recent IETF meeting in Philadelphia, attendees voted on three draft standards the group had been working on; the IETF seems to be developing standards compatible with the TNC standards.

It's going to be a long process. More than just the efficacy of the standard has to be worked out. To be deployed and accepted widely, there needs to be widespread support for NAC and ways to make it easy to deal with.

Security Center Editor Larry Seltzer has worked in and written about the computer industry since 1983.

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