RSA Finds More Flaws in RFID

After discovering a flaw in one of Texas Instruments' RFID tags, researchers from RSA Labs and Johns Hopkins University say they plan to continue their testing with exploits against other RFID equipment.

After uncovering a security weakness in a radio-frequency identification tag from Texas Instruments Inc., researchers from RSA Security Inc.s RSA Laboratories and The Johns Hopkins University are now eyeing future exploits against other RFID products in the interests of better security, one of the researchers said this week.

Meanwhile, TI will keep making the compromised RFID tag in order to meet the needs of applications more sensitive to speed and pricing than to privacy, according to a TI official.

The Johns Hopkins University Information Security Institute and RSA first publicized their findings about the RFID security hole in January.

In a paper posted at, the researchers claim that by cracking a proprietary cipher, or encryption algorithm in one of TIs DST (digital signature transponder) RFID tags, they were able to circumvent the tags built-in security enough to buy gasoline and turn on a cars ignition.

Tony Sabetti, global business manager for TIs RFID Systems, acknowledged that the DSTs contain some proven vulnerabilities. But Sabetti also described the security risk as relatively minimal, calling it a "tradeoff" that some makers of electronic payment and vehicle immobilization systems are willing to accept. Some of TIs customers in these niches produce car keys or tokens, and others, complete systems.

The RFID tags compromised by Johns Hopkins and RSA—part of TIs DST-40 tag lineup—use a proprietary 40-bit encryption algorithm first written in 1999.

"Why are we using a proprietary algorithm? Because its faster [that way] to produce inexpensive chips," Sabetti said.

The researchers from Johns Hopkins and RSA reverse-engineered and emulated the 40-bit encryption over two months.

But DST-40 tags are only one part of a larger RFID portfolio that also includes a DST "Plus" edition—featuring "a series of memory features and encryption scalable to 80 bits"—as well as an "RFID credit card" lineup with industry-standard 128-bit Triple DES encryption, he said.

/zimages/3/28571.gifeWEEK Labs Director Jim Rapoza says security is being trampled in the rush to put RFID everywhere. Click here to read his column.

TI keeps "vigilantly improving" products across this portfolio, according to Sabetti. But, he said, TI has no immediate plans to stop using the proprietary 40-bit cipher in its DST-40 tags. Customers that choose DST-40 tags from TIs lineup are generally seeking a combination of low pricing and quick processing speeds.

In a vehicle immobilization application, for example, it takes the 40-bit encryption scheme only about 250 milliseconds to "wake up the tag, do the encryption and encoding, and confirm that everythings correct," Sabetti said.

"But if you put [128-bit] Triple DES in there, all this would take 2 to 3 seconds—and that wouldnt be acceptable to most consumers."

Few people would be able to replicate the attack, anyway, Sabetti said. "Deciphering a 40-bit key isnt really that special of an event. But this was the work of professional mathematicians, statisticians, and cryptographers."

Moreover, TIs customers add other levels of security at the application layer, according to Sabetti.

Next page: Striking a balance between speed, cost and security.